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The U.S. president may act unilaterally in issuing executive orders within the office's inherent powers. To date, no cross‐time study has explored the relationship of his doing so with subsequent observed approval ratings. We do so here and estimate the relationship between the president's issuing of executive orders and subsequent job approval ratings at the aggregate level. While structural factors continue to explain long‐run approval rates, the president's use of unilateral powers also is associated through time with those rates, even when controlling for external factors such as wars and scandals. Thus, while some researchers may suspect that executive orders may undermine long‐term confidence in the institution of the presidency, we find that such uses of unilateral power may conditionally lead to gains in long‐term public opinion of the president.

AbstractScholars have been intrigued by the abrupt change in the rate of nonconsensual opinions that the Supreme Court has published over time, which substantially increased beginning with the battles concerning the court's New Deal transition in the 1930s. Notwithstanding, none of the prior studies on this topic has made any link, whether theoretical or empirical, between the Supreme Court's issuance of these special opinions and the justices' policy preferences. We utilize fractional cointegration to examine the relationship between consensus, agendas, and decisionmaking on the Supreme Court. We find that there is a systematic interrelation between the justices' policy preferences and their issuance of nonconsensual opinions that is dependent upon the policy agenda before the court. In turn, this connection influences the court's policy outcomes, demonstrating that the justices' behavior regarding nonconsensual opinion writing is a classic example of judicial policymaking.

Scholars have been intrigued by the abrupt change in the rate of nonconsensual opinions that the Supreme Court has published over time, which substantially increased beginning with the battles concerning the court's New Deal transition in the 1930s. Notwithstanding, none of the prior studies on this topic has made any link, whether theoretical or empirical, between the Supreme Court's issuance of these special opinions & the justices' policy preferences. We utilize fractional cointegration to examine the relationship between consensus, agendas, & decision making on the Supreme Court. We find that there is a systematic interrelation between the justices' policy preferences & their issuance of nonconsensual opinions that is dependent upon the policy agenda before the court. In turn, this connection influences the court's policy outcomes, demonstrating that the justices' behavior regarding nonconsensual opinion writing is a classic example of judicial policymaking. 5 Tables, 2 Figures, 37 References. Adapted from the source document.

Representation in political institutions, including the judiciary, is an important consideration for both political scientists & citizens. What factors systematically influence diversity among judges? In particular, does the method of selection affect the relative success of political minorities in attaining a seat on the bench? The answers to these questions have substantial normative & theoretical implications. We examine judges on all state supreme & intermediate appellate courts in 1985 & 1999 to assess the influence of various structural, political, & demographic factors on judicial diversity. We demonstrate that the ability of political minorities to attain a place in the judiciary is not solely a function of any single factor. Instead, their success is influenced by a multifaceted combination of factors contingent on time & the level of the court, & these influences differ for women & for minorities. 3 Tables, 1 Appendix, 58 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractRepresentation in political institutions, including the judiciary, is an important consideration for both political scientists and citizens. What factors systematically influence diversity among judges? In particular, does the method of selection affect the relative success of political minorities in attaining a seat on the bench? The answers to these questions have substantial normative and theoretical implications. We examine judges on all state supreme and intermediate appellate courts in 1985 and 1999 to assess the influence of various structural, political, and demographic factors on judicial diversity. We demonstrate that the ability of political minorities to attain a place in the judiciary is not solely a function of any single factor. Instead, their success is influenced by a multifaceted combination of factors contingent on time and the level of the court, and these influences differ for women and for minorities.

In this study, we examine whether the unique institutional position of the chief justice & the concomitant opportunities afforded its occupants to influence the US Supreme Court's decisionmaking affect the behavior of individuals who are promoted to the center chair. We theorize that incumbents of that office will change their behavior systematically to advance their broad set of goals, notably including the protection of the Court's institutional cohesiveness & legitimacy. Using data that cover more than a century of Supreme Court history (1894-1996), we examine whether the chief justice will concur & dissent less frequently, write fewer individual opinions, & moderate his policy views to attain those goals. We find that the place of the chief justice within the decisional structure of the Court, in part, serves to create an incentive structure associated with a systematic decrease in the number of concurring & dissenting votes cast & separate opinions written. Our results also imply that the office of the chief justice is associated with more moderate expressions of policy goals in economics & civil liberties-civil rights decision-making, which were the bulk of the Court's agenda during the period of analysis. 2 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 102 References. Adapted from the source document.

We seek to explore the opinion assignments of Chief Justices from 1888 to 1940 using three models: the organizational, institutional, & attitudinal models. Methods. We empirically examine opinion assignments from 1888 to 1940 through a data set that the authors have collected. Results. We find that earlier Chief Justices made assignments based on institutional & organizational criteria rather than for ideological reasons. Conclusions. We believe this difference is most likely related to contextual factors that have changed for the modern Court. 1 Table, 26 References. Adapted from the source document.

This analysis seeks to understand the decline of Supreme Court consensual norms often attributed to the failed leadership of Chief Justice Stone. A new unit of analysis-justice-level dissent and concurrence rates-supports an alternative view of observed increases in dissensual decision making. When these measures are estimated with time-series techniques, results offer evidence of multiple changepoints in this norm of the Court that both lead and lag Stone's elevation. Broader contextual explanations related to the alteration of the Court's discretionary issue agenda and its ideological and demographic composition also contribute to fractures in the once-unanimous voting coalitions. Adapted from the source document.

This analysis seeks to understand the decline of Supreme Court consensual norms often attributed to the failed leadership of Chief Justice Stone. A new unit of analysis—justice-level dissent and concurrence rates—supports an alternative view of observed increases in dissensual decision making. When these measures are estimated with time-series techniques, results offer evidence of multiple changepoints in this norm of the Court that both lead and lag Stone's elevation. Broader contextual explanations related to the alteration of the Court's discretionary issue agenda and its ideological and demographic composition also contribute to fractures in the once-unanimous voting coalitions.

In the last ten years, there has been a resurgence of interest in repression and violence within states. Paths to State Repression improves our understanding of why states use political repression, highlighting its relationship to dissent and mass protest. The authors draw upon a wide variety of political-economic contexts, methodological approaches, and geographic locales, including Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Israel, Eastern Europe, and Africa.